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Britain’s parliament has historically lacked formal war powers. Since 2003, however, MPs 
have voted five times on military action, including famously vetoing intervention in Syria in 
2013. A new convention developed that – regardless of the legal position – governments 
should permit the House of Commons the opportunity to veto certain military deployments. 
This article explores what we now know – and what we do not – about the British War 
Powers Convention. It identifies apparent exceptions, including non-combat, Special Forces 
and drone operations. It highlights areas lacking clarity: for example who decides what 
constitutes an ‘emergency’? It argues that most governments probably will allow the Hosue 
of Commons to have its say before using force abroad, that a government politically able to 
bypass MPs without punishment need not fear involving them, while one unable to win 
support will be punished for avoiding a vote. Finally, the article considers the implications, 
both positive and negative, of parliamentary war powers for Britain. 
 












As is common in Westminster-style democracies, Britain’s parliament has historically 
lacked formal war powers (Wagner et al. 2010, Joseph 2013). Despite this ambiguity, British 
MPs approved the invasion of Iraq, intervention in Libya, two rounds of action against ISIS 
(the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, otherwise know as Da’esh), and rejected intervention in 
Syria in 2013. Through these votes, a new political convention developed that – regardless of 
the legal position – governments should permit the House of Commons the opportunity to 
veto certain military deployments (Strong 2015a).  
Although the notion that some sort of British War Powers Convention exists is 
reasonably well-established, much about it remains unclear. Strong (2015b) observed that the 
Syria veto depended on immediate political circumstances that might not recur. Kaarbo and 
Kenealy (2016, 2017) noted how analogies to Iraq coloured subsequent debates. Lagassé 
(2016) identified how institutional and contextual factors interact in the British case, while 
Mello (2017) showed that different types of deployment attract different levels of scrutiny. 
Each contribution added detail to our emerging understanding of what the British War 
Powers Convention means. Each acknowledged that uncertainty remains. 
 This article attempts to specify what we know, and what we do not, about the British 
parliament’s involvement in military deployment decisions. It considers two dimensions 
addressed by this special issue: the opportunity structures for parliamentary involvement in 
security policy and the implications of parliamentary involvement for security policy (Mello 
and Peters 2018). It attempts to draw broader lessons relevant to other states, principally 
those rooted in the Westminster tradition, but potentially democracies more generally. It 
builds on existing literature by adopting a systematic approach and considering recent 
operations against Da’esh. It proposes four distinct political scenarios a future government 
contemplating the use of force might face, derived from the interaction of two variables: how 
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able the government believes itself to be to win a House of Commons vote, and how able it 
feels to bypass MPs. On the basis of this discussion, it concludes that future British 
governments will probably permit and win parliamentary votes before launching major 
combat operations, but that some uncertainty is unavoidable. Both conclusions have 
implications for Britain’s broader security stance.  
 
The constitutional position 
 
Westminster-style democracies – Britain, plus former British colonies – generally lack formal 
constitutions. Instead they distribute political power through an informal patchwork of 
written laws and unwritten conventions (Bagehot 2001, 178-199). Conventions, though not 
legally binding, nevertheless set clear limits on legitimate political conduct. They can and do 
constrain behaviour. Constitutional states like the US and Germany have supreme courts 
capable of adjudicating disputes. Conventional powers remain contestable, however widely-
accepted they become (Bono 2005, Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016, Mello 2017). Because they are 
socially constructed rather than written down, conventions can change surprisingly quickly 
and easily compared to formal rules (Foley 2004, Heffernan 2005a, Select Committee on the 
Constitution 2006, Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017).  
Britain’s War Powers Convention is a good illustrative example. Successive 
governments granted MPs influence over military deployments without meaning to. A series 
of independent decisions collectively added up to fundamental change. British MPs had no 
say over military deployments before 2003 (Bowers 2003). Prime Minister Tony Blair 
granted them a vote on Iraq as a one-off concession – a ‘remarkable exception’ (Wagner et et 
al., 2010, 100) – to shore up support amongst rebellious Labour MPs (Judge 2004, O'Malley 
2007). Blair’s move took on greater significance under Prime Minister David Cameron. 
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Cameron called a vote on Libya to differentiate himself from Blair’s ‘presidential’ style. He 
was then trapped by his own rhetoric into permitting a further vote on Syria, and lost. In 
accepting defeat he further cemented the new convention.  
 These developments are reversible. Cameron’s Cabinet Manual confirmed that ‘the 
House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter…before troops [are] 
committed’ (Cabinet Office 2011, 44). Such documents can be rewritten, or ignored. 
Cameron himself called parliament’s involvement in military deployments ‘a good 
convention’ (Cameron 2014, c1265). He is no longer Prime Minister, nor even an MP. Public 
opinion supports consulting MPs (YouGov 2013). Public opinion can shift. Most political 
elites seem to accept a Convention exists. But some – especially within the Conservative 
Party – think it places the government under intolerable constraint. Foreign Secretary Boris 
Johnson, for example, declared that the convention ‘needs to be tested’ during the June 2017 
election campaign (Johnson 2017). Downing Street rejected Johnson’s statement (MacAskill 
2017). But then Prime Minister Theresa May lost her majority, raising questions about how 
long she would remain in office, and what views her successor might hold.  
 Britain’s War Powers Convention developed against a backdrop of growing 
parliamentary influence. British governments have historically conducted international 
negotiations and called general elections as they saw fit. Theresa May, however, required 
parliamentary approval to begin the ‘Brexit’ process and to call the June 2017 election, 
though the bases for these shifts differed. MPs got to vote on ‘Brexit’ because the Supreme 
Court ruled that it meant abolishing statutory rights, something only parliament can do. The 
Court reaffirmed the government’s right, in principle, to make and break treaties. May 
needed a two-thirds supermajority of MPs to approve the June 2017 election because that was 
the threshold laid down by the Fixed Term Parliaments Act. Parliament’s power over 
elections is established by statute and enforceable by the courts. Its involvement in the Article 
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50 decision (to begin negotiations on UK withdrawal from the EU) was similarly subject to 
judicial enforcement, but it was also a one-off. Its say in military deployments is a general 
rather than a specific power, but it is not guaranteed by law.  
 This situation looks unlikely to change. Parliamentarians have unsuccessfully tried to 
pass a British War Powers Act. The problem is simple. Legislation would not necessarily 
improve, and might even weaken, parliament’s position. Parliaments cannot bind their 
successors. Whatever legislation one parliament passed, a future parliament could repeal 
(Bagehot 2001, Taylor and Kelly 2008). A government powerful enough to ignore the War 
Powers Convention could probably undo a War Powers Act. The calculations involved would 
be the same.  
Legislation could, furthermore, reduce MPs’ freedom to pursue more or less influence 
over individual deployments. Parliamentary pressure forced Foreign Secretary William 
Hague to guarantee a vote before Britain supplied weapons to Syrian rebels, something he 
was under no legal obligation to do. An Act would implicitly limit parliament’s power, 
making obtaining similar concessions difficult. Parliament decides for itself whether 
government actions comply with political conventions, and punishes non-compliance through 
political sanctions. Though party-political considerations limit MPs’ willingness to coerce 
ministers, legislation would transfer both functions entirely to the courts.  
No one seems to want judges revisiting decisions already made by MPs. Shadow 
Foreign Secretary Emily Thornberry complained that parliament’s war powers lacked legal 
support, yet thought it would be ‘entirely inappropriate’ if ‘a decision made in this House’ 
had to ‘be taken off to the courts’ (Thornberry 2016, c332). Baroness Falkner insisted, in 
defending her draft War Powers Bill, that there was a difference between judicial oversight of 
the general application of a law, and specific decisions (Falkner 2016, cc2257-2262). She lost 
the argument, and her effort failed. The hysterical reaction to the Supreme Court’s Article 50 
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decision (that Parliament must vote on triggering it) underlined the point. Most poll 
respondents thought neither the courts nor MPs should have been involved at all (YouGov 
2017). Gina Miller, the activist who led the legal challenge, received death threats (Cumbo 
2017). A Daily Mail front page labelled three judges who upheld Miller’s arguments 
‘enemies of the people’ (Slack 2016).   
 A fear of voter backlash meant most MPs voted to invoke Article 50 despite most 
having campaigned for Britain to stay in the EU. A fear of looking cowardly saw Labour 
support an early election in 2017 despite polls suggesting it would lose. On both occasions 
the fact MPs had the legal power to thwart government mattered little. What mattered was 
how willing (or otherwise) they were to use it. Most MPs believed that they already have the 
right to veto certain military deployments. That, in part, is why so few seem interested in 
enshrining it in law. It consequently remains a convention, subject to debate at every turn. A 
future government could ignore it without fear of a judicial response. Whether this result will 
actuallyoccur, however, depends on the specific political circumstances. It is consequently 





Like all conventional powers, the way the British War Powers Convention works depends 
logically on three inter-related factors. Firstly, it depends on the Prime Minister. Individual 
and institutional characteristics together constitute power in Westminster-style democracies 
(Heffernan 2003, 2005b, Lagassé 2016). Different leaders hold different beliefs about 
whether they should consult others before using force abroad. They also interpret political 
intelligence differently in deciding whether or not they need a collegial approach (Foyle 
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1997). Leaders furthermore vary in terms of their psychological ability to understand nuanced 
arguments and willingness to share power, as Kaarbo (2018) argues elsewhere in this special 
issue.  
How Britain’s War Powers Convention works depends, secondly, on the type of 
deployment proposed. How salient a proposed operation appears to MPs, and how directly it 
echoes past precedents, will vary. Both affect how strongly they demand a vote, and what the 
outcome will be. Thirdly, the extent to which MPs will get a vote on future deployments 
depends on politics. Specifically, as this section demonstrates, it depends on a) whether the 
government feels able to win a vote, and b) whether it is willing to bear the costs of 
bypassing parliament. Future British governments probably will allow parliamentary votes 
before launching combat operations abroad, except under certain specific circumstances. A 
repeat of the Syria veto of 2013, meanwhile, looks unlikely. The following sections set out 
where uncertainty remains.  
 
Ability to win 
 
Whether a future government feels able to win a vote on military action depends on the size 
of its majority, the coherence of its majority and the opposition’s stance. British Prime 
Ministers typically enjoy the consistent support of a majority of MPs (King 1976, Wallace 
1977). Back-bench MPs have grown more rebellious in recent years (Benedetto and Hix 
2007, Stuart 2009). The Fixed Term Parliaments Act also had an effect, by removing the 
Prime Minister’s historic right to designate any government motion a matter of confidence 
(Norton 2016) and so to discipline unruly MPs with the threat of fresh elections (Huber 1996, 
Diermeir and Feddersen 1998). Leaders can still threaten to resign, as Tony Blair (at least 
implicitly) did over Iraq (Phythian 2007). Forcing Labour MPs to choose between their most 
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successful leader ever and Saddam Hussein did seem to boost the pro-war vote (Strong 
2017). But Blair’s experience will likely remain a ‘rare event’ (Hill 2005, 399). Few 
governments are so committed to any aspect of security policy that raising the stakes so high 
makes sense.  
 All else being equal, a government with a large parliamentary majority will be more 
able than one with a smaller majority to win a vote on military action. The five votes between 
2003 and 2015 suggest that MPs are especially willing to follow their own personal beliefs 
and rebel over military action. This point holds across party lines. Labour MPs rebelled over 
Iraq in 2003. Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs rebelled over Syria in 2013. Labour 
failed even to agree a common position on ISIS/Da’esh in 2015. MPs will sometimes approve 
military action, as well as (more commonly) rejecting it, against their leaders’ advice. Every 
government will likely face rebellions over the use of force. Those with larger majorities can 
absorb larger rebellions.   
 Across democratic states, right-leaning politicians tend to look more favourably than 
their left-leaning counterparts on the use of force, though Britain is something of an outlier 
because the Labour Party is unusually pro-use of force (Palmer, London and Regan 2004, 
Wagner, Herranz-Surralles, et al. 2017). A Conservative British government nevertheless 
looks more able than a Labour one to rely on its own MPs to support the use of force. A 
Conservative government is probably also less likely to be able to rely on opposition support 
than a Labour one. There is, in other words, no government more able to win a House of 
Commons vote on military action than a strong Labour one. Though Tony Blair faced the 
largest parliamentary rebellion in history over Iraq, he still won support from three-quarters 
of MPs, thanks to Conservative assistance and the sheer number of Labour MPs. There is, 
similarly, no government less able to win a vote on military action in the House of Commons 
than a weak Conservative one. Though the Conservative-led coalition enjoyed a decent 
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majority of 76 in 2013, it evaporated over Syria. It had to make substantive concessions to 
win Labour support over ISIS/Da’esh in 2014. Party politics and institutional pressures 
interacted to shape Britain’s security stance (Mello 2012).  
This pattern is not absolute. Labour has a strong tradition of what Toynbee (2001) has 
called ‘hard liberalism’; being willing to use force to defend human rights. The Conservative 
Party similarly sometimes exhibits “soft realism”; an unwillingness to sacrifice for collective 
goods. Labour MPs are generally more pro-European than Atlanticist, while Conservatives 
are more Atlanticist than pro-European. Though Labour looks more sceptical of military 
action in general, the Conservative Party may be less willing to support operations lacking a 
clear national interest justification or a transatlantic dimension. The balance of opinion within 
each party also varies. Labour split over fighting ISIS/Da’esh in 2015, as Hilary Benn led an 
“internationalist” rebellion against Jeremy Corbyn’s anti-interventionism. Labour’s 
unexpectedly strong performance in the June 2017 election cemented Corbyn’s position and 
made future splits less likely. All else being equal, then, a weak Conservative government 
looks more likely than any other sort to struggle. But considerable uncertainty remains.  
 
Costs of bypassing parliament 
 
Whether a government feels it will face disproportionate political costs for ignoring the War 
Powers Convention depends on the nature of the possible political punishments it faces, how 
likely it is that MPs will actually punish it, and how risk-averse ministers are. MPs can 
censure a government in a variety of different ways. In extreme circumstances, they can 
pursue the ‘nuclear option’ of a confidence vote. Given that would mean at least some 
government back-benchers voting their own party out of office, it looks improbable. That the 
possibility exists probably affects ministers’ calculations, but few will lose sleep over it. 
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More mildly, MPs can attempt to assert control of the parliamentary timetable. A number of 
days are reserved in each parliamentary session for debates on issues chosen by the 
opposition. These can be used to consider security policy, as for example happened in 
January 2014 when MPs debated the government’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis. MPs 
can also organize special debates in Westminster Hall, though these do not involve formal 
votes. Most dramatically, during the summer of 2002 a group of back-benchers successfully 
forced the Blair government to recall parliament from its summer recess to debate Iraq by 
arranging an ‘unofficial’ Commons sitting that risked embarrassing ministers. Back-bench 
MPs can also launch party leadership challenges on the grounds of foreign policy 
disagreements. The internal coup against Margaret Thatcher was partly driven by divisions 
over Europe. They can publicly criticize the government, potentially damaging its ability to 
set the agenda for public debate, or threaten retribution in other policy areas.  
 Whether a government actually faces punishment for bypassing the War Powers 
Convention will depend on how salient the proposed deployment is to MPs. MPs are less 
likely to expend political capital in dealing with issues they consider less important. Whether 
a military operation looks salient depends in turn on the nature of the deployment proposed  
and on public opinion. If the public is highly polarized or mobilized – as it was over Iraq – it 
is more likely that MPs will want a say. Precedent matters too. MPs are more likely to care 
about losing powers they have previously held than gaining new powers. Newer MPs may 
not even realize that their war powers derive from convention, not legislation. How risk-
averse a government will be depends in turn on individual-level factors. Tony Blair was more 
willing to risk losing office over Iraq than his own MPs were to risk losing him. Cameron 
delayed votes on ISIS/Da’esh because he did not think the risk of defeat worthwhile. Theresa 
May proved herself both loathe to share power and risk averse when she opposed 
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parliamentary involvement in the Article 50 decision. When she actually did take a risk, by 
calling the June 2017 election, she lost.  
 
Future governments will probably uphold the War Powers Convention 
 
Table 1 depicts four logically plausible scenarios a future government trying to decide 
whether to allow a vote on military action might face. It indicates that future governments 
will probably uphold the War Powers Convention. 
 
Table 1: Plausible potential scenarios for future UK governments considering allowing a parliamentary vote on 
military action.  
  
 
Perceived ability to win a parliamentary vote 
 
  High Low 
Perceived political 
costs of bypassing 
parliament 
High 
Scenario 1: Costs of avoiding vote high. 
Government holds vote, e.g., Iraq 2003, 
Syria 2013, ISIS/Da’esh 2015. 
Scenario 3. Costs of both holding 
and avoiding vote high. 




Scenario 2. Costs of holding vote low. 
Leadership personality and precedent 
decisive, e.g. Libya 2011. 
Scenario 4. Costs of avoiding vote 
low. Outcome depends on 
deployment type, e.g. ISIS/Da’esh 
drone strikes 2015 
 
In scenario 1 the government perceives that it can win a vote and that bypassing MPs would 
be disproportionately costly. Arguably, Blair’s Iraq vote fits here alongside Cameron’s votes 
on Syria in 2013 and ISIS/Da’esh in 2015. On each occasion the government judged that the 
costs of bypassing parliament were disproportionate, and that the prospects for success were 
sufficient to risk a veto. The inclusion of the Syrian case demonstrates how subjective these 
judgements are. Governments can read the political tea-leaves wrong. Cameron was probably 
right that he could not afford to intervene in Syria without parliamentary approval. His 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats would have collapsed. At the same time, he 
overestimated Conservative support for military action. He lost and learned from his mistake, 
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delaying the vote on action against ISIS/Da’esh from June to September 2014 to allow more 
time for consultations.  
In scenario 2 the government perceives that it can win a parliamentary vote but also 
that it could bypass MPs without disproportionate political cost. Here both personality and 
precedent come into play. David Cameron apparently believed that MPs should have a say on 
military action when he called the Libya vote. At the same time, with clear evidence of a 
threat to civilian life from the Gaddafi regime’s advance on Benghazi and UN Security 
Council approval, he knew he would win comfortably. He stood to gain legitimacy by 
allowing MPs to rubber-stamp a decision he already knew they would support. So Cameron 
did it, albeit after ordering the first strikes. In the process he set a precedent he felt compelled 
to follow. Future governments will face the greater weight of precedents that Cameron left 
behind, whether ministers believe in parliamentary power or not. 
In scenario 3, the government feels unable to avoid a vote but also unable to win. A 
government facing scenario 3 is likely to change policy, either moving away from military 
action as the Cameron government did in Syria after the 2013 veto or, as when it restricted 
British operations against ISIS/Da’esh to Iraqi territory from September 2014 to December 
2015, compromising with opposition parties in return for their support. Had Cameron 
accurately perceived the degree of opposition within his own party to intervention in Syria, 
that vote would also have fallen into this category.  
Cameron did make concessions in 2013. He ruled out the use of force until after UN 
inspectors reported, and promised to hold a further vote. He failed to do enough. By forcing 
ministers to adapt their proposals ahead of a vote, as in scenario 3, the parliamentary 
prerogative in the UK mimics the effect of the War Powers Resolution in the US. What 
matters is not the veto power itself, but how governments design policies that anticipate 
legislators’ attitudes (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997, Mello and Lagasse 2018). 
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In scenario 4, finally, the government believes it cannot win a vote, but that it can get 
away without holding one. This scenario might happen if MPs either do not know or do not 
care about a particular operation, if the government believes so strongly in the merits of its 
case that it is willing to risk defeat on a confidence motion, or if the government feels safe 
from significant retribution. In practice, it seems unlikely that MPs will lose interest in 
military deployments, and most of the deployment types discussed in the following section 
are hard to keep secret (drone strikes being a possible exception). It also seems unlikely that a 
government would risk losing office to pursue a particular foreign policy. But it could 
happen.  
What we learn from all of this is that the question of whether MPs will have a vote on 
future military deployments depends on the political circumstances surrounding a proposed 
action. Given the subjective nature of the judgements described – a government’s ability to 
predict each of the key political variables will itself vary – that leaves a good deal of 
uncertainty. It seems likely that MPs will get a vote on future deployments – depending on 
their type. But it cannot be certain, and the prospect of recent precedents being entirely 
reversed remains. Compared to constitutional democracies, Britain’s war powers convention 
looks very weak. But depending on the circumstances, it can be strong enough to constrain 




One striking feature of the broader literature on parliamentary war powers is the range of 
different types of military deployment discussed. Germany’s Bundestag, for example, must 
approve any out-of-area military deployment, regardless of size or type (Schade 2018). But 
Germany is, for historical reasons, an unusual case. It is more common for a state’s war 
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powers law to specify circumstances under which governments can act without legislative 
approval, for example if the deployment proposed is small or short (Peters and Wagner 
2011). Deployment type matters in Britain, too, but the absence of a War Powers Act means 
there are no hard and fast rules. Instead, what matters is whether a particular operation is 
politically contentious. What makes an operation contentious varies. Generally speaking, the 
War Powers Convention applies, as Defence Secretary Michael Fallon put it, ‘to conflict 
decisions rather than routine deployments’ (Fallon 2016, c10WS). British troops must expect 
to face or use deadly force – to have ‘skin in the game’ (McCormack 2016, 22). The 
campaign against ISIS/Da’esh was envisioned as a combat mission from the start, and subject 
to two House of Commons votes. No one expected Britain’s support for French intervention 
in Mali, participation in NATO exercises in the Baltic States or anti-piracy activities off the 
Horn of Africa to involve fighting, so there were no votes (Watt and Harding 2013).  
Whether MPs will demand a say over more ambiguous situations remains unclear. 
They know and are exercised by the risks of ‘mission creep’. That makes sense. Britain has 
recent form when it comes to one type of deployment turning into another. Operation Palliser 
in 2000 initially involved evacuating European civilians from Sierra Leone. It escalated 
unexpectedly into a full-scale intervention in a nascent civil war (Ucko 2016). British 
ministers downplayed the first deployment of British troops to Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan. Defence Secretary John Reid told journalists in Kabul that they ‘would be 
perfectly happy to leave in three years and without firing one shot’ (BBC 2006). Things did 
not turn out that way. British forces fired forty-six million shots over the next eight years 
(Mail Online 2015).  
How MPs understand ‘mission creep’ is, however, coloured by memories of Iraq 
(Strong 2015b, Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017). Viewing new proposed operations through the 
Iraq analogy leads them to worry more about the risk that military action will escalate in the 
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Middle East compared to elsewhere. They voted against a limited campaign of airstrikes in 
Syria in 2013, but did not demand a vote at all when the government put British ‘boots on the 
ground’ in Mali or the Baltic. It remains possible, furthermore, that an apparently routine 
future deployment could escalate, with MPs then having to decide whether to demand a 
retrospective vote. What exactly will happen then remains unclear. So far the British War 
Powers Convention lacks a retrospective component.  
Some states automatically authorise ministers to uphold UN Security Council 
Resolutions using force, but require a parliamentary vote for non-UN operations. Others 
make Security Council approval a legal prerequisite for parliamentary support (Wagner et al. 
2010). Britain’s War Powers Convention imposes no comparable requirements, but Security 
Council approval nevertheless matters. It affects how able the government is to win a vote, 
and whether MPs compare a proposed operation to Iraq (Oliver 2015, Kaarbo and Kenealy 
2016, 2017). It also calms sceptics’ concerns. As Robin Cook observed during the invasion of 
Afghanistan, many of those MPs ‘who would normally have reservations about military 
action are also those who are most respectful of international cooperation’ (Cook 2003, 45-
46). That the Libyan intervention enjoyed both UN approval and wide international support 
helps explain why just thirteen MPs voted against it (Fisher and Biggar 2011). Labour MPs 
who supported action against ISIS/Da’esh in December 2015 justified their stance by 
pointing to SCR 2249. Given governments are more likely to hold votes they think they can 
win, this implies they are more likely to hold votes on operations with Security Council 
approval. There is no firm requirement, however.  
Special Forces operations do not fall under the British War Powers Convention, at 
least for now. When parliament endorsed Britain’s involvement in fighting ISIS/Da’esh in 
Syria, David Cameron promised that ‘the Government will not deploy UK ground troops in 
combat operations’ (Cameron 2015b, c323). In August 2016 the BBC published images of 
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British Special Forces soldiers in Syria helping to secure a rebel base against attack – a 
combat role (BBC 2016). Few MPs took notice, and there was no significant pressure for a 
vote. Most apparently accepted that Special Forces operations are exceptional. Whether they 
would continue to accept that if a future mission went wrong – leading to large-scale military 
or civilian casualties, for example, or if a future government significantly expanded the range 
and scope of Special Forces deployments – remains unclear.  
Drone strikes, by contrast, fall under the Convention in theory, but are unlikely ever 
to come to a vote. In August 2015 – before MPs approved British action in Syria – an RAF 
drone strike near Raqqa killed Reyaad Khan and Junaid Hussain, two British citizens fighting 
with ISIS/Da’esh. Explaining his decision to authorize the strike, Cameron argued that he had 
in fact complied with the War Powers Convention. He maintained that he had always insisted 
that in the face of an urgent threat ‘you could act immediately and explain to the House of 
Commons afterwards’ (Cameron 2015a, c26). That applied to drone strikes as much as to any 
other time of military deployment.  
Cameron’s caveat opened up another area of uncertainty. British governments are 
under no legal obligation to permit MPs a vote before launching military action. They accept 
some degree of moral obligation, but also assert the right to act first and consult later when 
facing an imminent threat to national security or humanitarian catastrophe. It is unclear what 
constitutes ‘imminence’ in this context, what criteria identify someone or something as a 
threat to national security and what sort of humanitarian catastrophes are covered. In the 
absence of formal definitions, the government’s powers will be up for debate in each new 
situation. It is impossible to predict what a future parliament will accept. Cameron got away 
with the 2015 drone strike. Several MPs and commentators expressed concern about what the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (2016) called a ‘new departure’ for Britain’s drone 
programme. But few claimed parliament should have voted on the operation first 
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(McCormack 2016). Indeed, the Committee explicitly accepted that Cameron acted in line 
with the War Powers Convention. To some extent he benefitted from the fact the operation 
was already over. MPs could hardly veto the killing of Khan and Hussain after the fact. 
Whether they would tolerate a series of drone operations without a vote remains unclear; the 
2015 strike was a one-off.  
Cameron, meanwhile, never really lived up to his promise to ‘explain’ his decision to 
MPs. Although the Intelligence and Security Committee (2017) concluded both Khan and 
Hussein were legitimate targets, it complained that the government withheld crucial legal 
advice from its investigation. Having been rushed out ahead of the June 2017 election, this 
report generated limited backlash. Cameron was out of office by then, anyway.  
In sum, then, the extent and nature of Britain’s parliamentary war powers vary 
depending on the type of military operation proposed. MPs expect to vote on deployments 
likely to involve combat. Thanks to Iraq’s lingering shadow, they think ‘mission creep’ 
especially likely in the Middle East, meaning that they demand more oversight of operations 
there than elsewhere. They are more willing to approve deployments already supported by 
the UN Security Council. This willingness should make governments more willing to subject 
such deployments to a vote, but the relationship is indirect. Most MPs believe that Special 
Forces operations require secrecy, and so accept successive governments’ assertions that such 
deployments fall outside the War Powers Convention. Most also accept that governments 
sometimes have to act quickly in response to developments, seeking approval retrospectively.  
Both these attitudes could change if tested, though MPs seem unlikely ever to vote 
against troops already in combat. Complaints made during the Libya debate, which took 
place shortly after the first shots were fired, led Foreign Secretary William Hague to promise 
to recall MPs to vote before any future deployment. That promise partly lay behind the 
‘fiasco’ of the Syria vote, as MPs wondered what they had been recalled early for if not to 
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vote on the use of force (Gaskarth 2016). Cameron learned that delay was preferable to 
defeat. He got away with the August 2015 drone strike because it was, in fact, a one-off. MPs 
seem far less likely to accept repeated attempts to exclude deadly operations from 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
Future governments can, legally, launch military operations without prior approval 
then claim retrospectively that they acted in an emergency. Whether parliament will accept 
such claims, and what will happen if it does not, will depend on the specific circumstances 
and is difficult to predict. When we consider the types of deployment likely to trigger 




It is important not to over-estimate how significant Britain’s parliamentary war powers are. 
British MPs largely lack ‘agenda control’ – the capacity to decide what issues they debate 
(Auerswald and Cowhey 1997, Auerswald 1999, 2004) – meaning they cannot initiate policy 
proposals of their own. Most use political heuristics to guide their decisions about military 
action, meaning governments can generally rely on their own back-benchers. Though some 
MPs reject the use of force outright, the majority are willing to consider each case on its 
merits. This means that the House of Commons would probably approve military action in a 
genuine emergency, in the event of a direct threat to national security and in response to an 
attack on a NATO ally. No-one, meanwhile, has yet proposed extending parliament’s role 
beyond the point of the initial decision to deploy troops. Once MPs have approved an 
operation, the government can largely do what it wants.  
Despite these very real limitations, the British War Powers Convention still has 
significant implications – both positive and negative – for how Britain uses force, and so for 
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its broader security stance. Ministers who know they must justify a decision to take military 
action in public should do a better job than their predecessors of thinking through such 
decisions in private. MPs can and will veto deployments they think ill-conceived, as 
Cameron’s experience over Syria showed. Though many are influenced by party politics, a 
significant minority will vote according to the quality of the government’s case. If MPs 
blindly vote against the use of force at every opportunity, the government will be undesirably 
constrained. But if enough of them are willing to hear ministers’ arguments out, future 
governments should be able to win support by presenting clear, well-developed and viable 
proposals. Parliamentary scrutiny could, in sum, improve the quality of Britain’s military 
deployments.  
Whether MPs actually make better decisions than ministers about the use of force 
remains unclear, however. They are often less well-informed, and so more likely to rely on 
ill-fitting heuristics. Judging the prospect of further military action through the Iraq analogy, 
for example, makes sense in terms of avoiding comparable errors of commission, but offers 
little protection from errors of omission. There was little similarity between the Iraq War and 
the intervention proposed for Syria in 2013. That is not to say MPs erred by vetoing the latter 
operation – it had both legal and strategic flaws – but rather that if they did it simply to avoid 
repeating Iraq, as many of them claimed, they acted irrationally. Unlike ministers, 
furthermore, MPs generally avoid being held accountable for unsuccessful deployments they 
approve. No-one today blames parliament for Iraq even though three-quarters of MPs voted 
for it. The Foreign Affairs Committee (2016) condemned Cameron for how British 
operations in Libya turned out, despite the fact eight of its eleven members supported 
intervention. 
To understand how Britain’s War Powers Convention affects its broader strategic 
stance we need to turn to the literature on inter-state bargaining. Though much of this focuses 
 19 
empirically on the United States, its core conceptual propositions should apply just as well in 
a UK context, since they highlight the interplay between domestic and international 
bargaining games. One such proposition matters above all, for our purposes. The extent to 
which a state can make credible promises and threats to international bargaining partners 
depends on the ratification processes such commitments must pass through at home. It varies 
when they do. From this perspective, granting MPs a veto over the use of force inevitably 
changes Britain’s nature as an ally and an enemy, with both positive and negative results. 
On the positive side, obtaining parliamentary approval for a military deployment 
allows Britain to signal commitment to both its allies and its enemies. Winston Churchill – 
then Leader of the Opposition – requested a formal vote before the Korean War in 1950 to 
demonstrate that Britain was united behind the UN, despite objections from a vocal minority 
of MPs. In the process he also signalled that a future change of government would not mean a 
change of policy. Governments that seek and win parliamentary approval for military action 
as part of a policy of coercive diplomacy risk ‘audience costs’ – retrospective punishment for 
their inconstancy – should they fail to carry a public threat through (Fearon 1994).  
From this perspective, a government forced to gain parliamentary approval for 
military action should be more credible as an adversary than one free to act as it sees fit 
(Partell and Palmer 1999). Governments can also use their need to win parliamentary 
approval as leverage in developing joint strategic positions with other states. Tony Blair 
convinced President Bush to let him seek a ‘second’ Security Council Resolution on Iraq in 
early 2003 by emphasizing his need to secure Labour Party approval in the House of 
Commons. In Putnam’s (1988) terms, Blair reduced the size of his domestic ‘win-set’ by 
promising a parliamentary vote on Iraq, enabling him to extract concessions from Bush by 
credibly threatening that British support might be withdrawn (against his personal wishes) 
otherwise. 
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The picture is, however, qualified. Involving MPs in decisions about military action 
does not seem to legitimize the resulting operations – as Iraq showed (Strong 2017). The 
degree to which democracies make reliable allies, meanwhile, generally depends on how 
formalized their international commitments are (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). Legislators 
feel bound by treaties they have ratified (Leeds, Mattes and Vogel 2009, Tago 2009). Away 
from formal alliance agreements, however, democracies become more flighty. Those that 
grant greater power to legislatures (Reiter and Tillman 2002) or minority parties (Leblang 
and Chan 2003), or where the electoral incentives at work militate against long-term strategic 
thinking (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999), find making lasting international commitments 
harder than those with less legislative control.  
In the British case, the uncertainty surrounding the War Powers Convention 
complicates the picture further. Though it seems likely that MPs will get to vote on major 
military operations in future, they might not – meaning an ally trying to predict how loyal 
Britain will be must make the two related calculations discussed above. Though MPs 
probably would approve the use of force in response to an attack on a NATO member – 
member state elites take NATO commitments especially seriously (Kreps 2010) – they might 
not. We know for definite – the Syria vote proved it – that they are willing in principle to 
reverse an ad hoc government commitment to use force if they have problems with the 
operation proposed or if ministers get the politics wrong. 
Britain’s War Powers Convention has probably done more to undermine than to 
reinforce its credibility as an ally. President Obama did not wait for – or even request – 
British support before striking Da’esh in Iraq in June 2014. David Cameron took until 
September to win parliamentary support, and it was not until December 2015 that Britain 
extended its operations across the whole Da’esh theatre of activity. President Trump struck 
the Assad regime in April 2017 without seeking British assistance. Contrary to the ‘audience 
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costs’ model, British MPs are more concerned about the substance of a particular military 
proposal than about consistency (Thomson 2016). Ministers cannot force their hand by 
making public threats before proceeding to a vote, Syria proved as much.  
Yet scope remains for parliament’s involvement in military deployments to strengthen 
rather than weakening the government’s hand in future. As we have seen, ministers can use 
the fact that they need to win MPs’ approval to press more sensible military strategies onto 
reluctant allies. They can also use a House of Commons vote to lock in their political rivals, 
and so make more credible commitments and threats than would have been possible 
previously. Blair won Conservative support for action in Iraq. Cameron won Labour support 
for action in Libya, and for the first round of action against Da’esh. In the process, both men 
insulated themselves against future electoral retribution and made it less likely a change of 
government would mean a reversal of their stance.  
Cameron’s vote on the second round of action against Da’esh in 2015, which split the 
Labour Party, looks less helpful from this perspective. If governments want to secure the 
benefits of involving MPs in military deployment decisions, they should ideally ensure they 
win opposition support, even if they can win without it. They should also be careful not to 
promise or threaten too much without gaining parliamentary approval first. Cameron looked 
foolish over Syria because he made promises he ultimately could not keep. Future 
governments could both avoid Cameron’s fate and gain the ability to make highly credible 
commitments by seeking parliamentary approval for military action before making explicit 
public threats, or at least as part of the process. So far no British government has tried this, 







Parliamentarians politicize security policy decisions. That has clearly been true in 
Britain. But the British case also suggests that the degree of legislative involvement in 
security matters is itself political, a point that might apply to other democracies – evidence 
from Finland (Raunio 2018) and Germany (Hegemann 2018) suggests it does. Absent a 
formal written constitution, or strong judicial oversight of the balance between executive and 
legislative power, parliamentary war powers in Westminster-style states remain subject to 
consensus, compromise and elite debate. Even absent legislation guaranteeing their 
involvement, MPs can demand a say over military deployment decisions. They can get it by 
wielding both carrots and sticks; by threatening retribution while proffering support. Some of 
this applies also in states with more formal constitutional rules. Formal rules affect how able 
governments are to bypass parliaments, but do not affect their ability to win a vote, nor 
parliamentarians’ ability to demand influence over matters beyond their formal remit. 
Precedents, meanwhile, are sticky. British MPs are likely in future to have the chance 
to veto military combat deployments, if for no other reason than because allowing a vote has 
become the default. Conventions can be challenged, or changed. Without legislation, there is 
no guarantee that a future House of Commons will demand a vote on military action. Indeed, 
there is no guarantee that legislation would constrain government action. Yet the prospect of 
parliamentary censure probably does shape ministerial calculations. Though much remains 
unclear, it is at this stage quite well established that Britain’s parliament should in future have 
a meaningful say over major military combat deployments. Similar developments could 
follow in comparable states, like Canada (Lagassé and Mello 2018). 
Britain’s setup has implications for its ability, and for the ability of similar states, to 
make credible international alliances and threats. Westminster-style parliaments cannot bind 
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their successors. They cannot prejudge what future generations will accept. Whether MPs 
will demand and get a say over a particular military operation is difficult to predict far in 
advance. How they will actually vote is also uncertain. Future governments, learning the 
lesson of Cameron in 2013, will likely be more cautious about what they ask MPs to approve. 
But it remains possible that they might commit to military action, then seek parliamentary 
approval and lose. Britain is no longer as reliable an ally, nor as credible an adversary, as it 
was before 2003. It will probably, but not definitely, stay that way. 
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